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SUPRANATIONAL RULINGS AS 
JUDGMENTS AND PRECEDENTS 
ERNEST A. YOUNG* 
Why do domestic courts routinely enforce arbitral awards 
rendered by tribunals operating abroad, and yet frequently refuse to 
defer to the decisions rendered by supranational judicial bodies? 
Scholars of international and foreign relations law have increasingly 
engaged the “interjurisdictional problem” concerning the relationship 
between domestic and supranational courts,1 but this literature 
frequently pays relatively little attention to the burgeoning 
phenomenon of international arbitration.2  Although contributors to 
this Symposium have debated whether international arbitration is 
really crowding out traditional litigation as the most important 
method for resolving transnational disputes,3 there is no doubt that 
international arbitration is a highly successful phenomenon.  Nor can 
one deny the existence of a marked disparity between the receptivity 
of domestic courts to transnational arbitral awards, on the one hand, 
and the considerably greater skepticism with which such courts greet 
 
* Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  This essay is part of the Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law’s symposium on “Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudicative System,” 
held on Feb. 15, 2008.  I am grateful to the Journal for the opportunity to participate, to John 
Gotanda, Ralf Michaels, and my co-panelists Mark Movsesian and Melissa Waters for helpful 
comments, to Erin Blondel for excellent research assistance, and to Allegra Young on general 
principle. 
 1. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of 
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Jenny Martinez, Towards an International 
Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).  For my 
own contribution to this literature, see Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a 
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional 
Settlement]. 
 2. There are, of course, exceptions.  See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, 
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 700 (2003) 
(considering the arbitral model as one of several different models for the relationship between 
domestic and supranational courts). 
 3. Compare Thomas E. Carbonneau, Commercial Peace and Political Competition in the 
Crosshairs of International Arbitration, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 308 (2008) (asserting that 
arbitration is supplanting traditional litigation), with Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, 
Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 447 (2008) 
(questioning the actual dominance of arbitration). 
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the decisions of supranational courts like the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). 
Some have suggested that this disparity can be traced to a 
distinction between “public” law, which “regulat[es] the relations of 
individuals with the government and the organization and conduct of 
the government itself,”4 and “private” law, which is “concerned with 
private persons, property, and relationships.”5  To be sure, the great 
bulk of international arbitral awards have concerned private 
contractual disputes, and these sorts of awards seem to engender the 
least resistance to their enforcement.6  The most prominent domestic 
decisions refusing to defer to supranational courts, on the other hand, 
have come in the public law area.7  But the Legal Realists taught 
American lawyers to be skeptical of sharp distinctions between the 
“public” and “private” spheres, and it is not hard to trace the public 
implications of even purely contractual norms being developed in 
supranational arbitral rulings.  I want to suggest a different ground for 
distinction in this brief essay: The commercial arbitral awards that are 
so readily enforced by domestic courts are simply judgments, which 
do not implicate the law declaring functions of courts.  Domestic 
courts have been considerably more skeptical, however, when asked 
 
 4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public%20-
law (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990) 
(defining “public law” as “[a] general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional, 
administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the 
relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers 
to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the relations of states to one another”). 
 5. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, supra note 4; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 4, at 1196 (defining “private law” “as used “in contradistinction to public law,” as 
“that part of the law which is administered between citizen and citizen, or which is concerned 
with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in 
whom the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are private 
individuals”).  The mission statement for the conference panel to which this essay contributes, 
for example, asks “Why are many states seemingly not as receptive to the decisions of public 
international courts as they are to private arbitral decisions?”  Ralf Michaels, Opening 
Remarks, Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication System – Three Questions to the 
Panelists, 2008 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law Symposium, in 18 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 253 (2008). 
 6. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable . . . .”); see, e.g., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 
1967) (applying the Federal Arbitration Act to private contract claims); Siemens Westinghouse 
Power Corp. v. Dick Corp., 293 F. Supp 2d 344, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same). 
 7. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006) (refusing to defer to 
the International Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations). 
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to defer to the precedential effect of supranational decisions or the 
interpretive authority of the supranational courts that issue them. 
I also want to argue that this disparity in treatment, when viewed 
as one between the force of supranational decisions as judgments and 
as precedents, makes eminent good sense.  The law-declaring 
function of courts implicates the interests of autonomy and 
accountability that lie at the heart of any credible notion of 
sovereignty.  Domestic courts are properly hesitant to cede this 
function to supranational bodies, especially when the democratic 
legitimacy (and possibly the procedural transparency and integrity) of 
those tribunals is dubious.  By contrast, the enforcement of a 
judgment, without more, typically settles the dispute between the 
parties without resolving the rights of parties not before the court.  
Particularly where the parties have already consented to the arbitral 
forum, there are few sovereign concerns to outweigh the efficiency 
gains to be had from barring relitigation. 
Even when we are concerned with the force of foreign rulings as 
judgments rather than precedents, however, those rulings do not 
automatically have domestic force.  Foreign arbitral awards are 
binding domestically because Congress has ratified the treaty 
governing such awards and incorporated that treaty into domestic 
statutes.  Where such legislative implementation is absent, courts 
have been—and ought to be—far more hesitant to accord domestic 
force to foreign and supranational judgments. 
This essay has two parts.  Part One develops the puzzle of 
domestic deference to foreign decisions in arbitral cases and 
skepticism of such decisions in “public” cases.  Part Two rejects 
accounts of this distinction grounded in a sharp dichotomy between 
public and private, and advances an alternative account grounded in 
two other variables: the distinction between judgments and 
precedents, and the primary role of Congress in determining when 
foreign rulings will have domestic force.  I suggest some broader 
implications of this analysis in the Conclusion. 
I. A PUZZLING DISPARITY? 
Many observers have remarked on the unfortunate disconnect 
between public and private international law.  That disconnect can 
distort our perceptions of the nascent global judicial system.  On the 
public side, potential intrusions by supranational judicial bodies—e.g., 
the International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Appellate Body—into domestic litigation seem unusual and 
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suspect, despite the frequency with which foreign decisions impact 
domestic entities and disputes in the context of commercial 
arbitration.  On the other side of the coin, the success of commercial 
arbitration at performing certain functions in certain kinds of disputes 
may tempt private international lawyers to underestimate the 
difficulty of incorporating supranational decisions that play more 
public roles into the domestic legal system.  I ultimately argue here 
that the international arbitration model should not influence, to any 
great extent, the ways in which domestic courts treat supranational 
decisions that purport to declare the law rather than simply resolve 
disputes.  But that is not to deny that we can learn a great deal from 
the comparison.  There is a significant disparity between the 
treatment of foreign decisions in the arbitration and public law 
contexts, and unearthing the reasons for it can help us better 
understand the enterprise of transnational decisionmaking in each 
context. 
A. Domestic Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Arbitral awards originating outside the American legal system 
are routinely enforced, in keeping with a more general enthusiasm for 
arbitration in the domestic legal system.8 Under the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards,9 commonly known as the New York Convention, domestic 
courts apply a highly deferential standard of review. “The Convention 
does not give courts the power to refuse enforcement of an award 
because it disagrees with the substantive outcome on the merits”;10 
rather, courts are obliged to enforce the award unless one of the 
narrow grounds for refusal specified in the treaty is met.11 Both 
 
 8. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (striking down a California 
law restricting arbitration agreements and declaring “a national policy favoring arbitration”); 
Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 60 (1997) (“The judiciary’s attitude toward arbitration has 
undergone a startling transformation” that “has assured the liberal interpretation and 
enforcement of arbitration agreements” and “has disabled public policy objections to the 
arbitration of certain statutory claims.”). 
 9. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 10. Howard A. Ellins & Christopher H. Withers, Judicial Deference to the Authority of 
Arbitrators to Interpret and Apply Federal Antitrust Laws, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 387, 397 
(2001). 
 11. See generally Alford, supra note 2, at 700-04; Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, 
Confirmation of Foreign Arbitral Award Under Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 194 A.L.R. FED. 291 (2004). 
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Congress and the federal courts have enthusiastically assimilated this 
treaty obligation into domestic law.  Congress has explicitly 
incorporated the New York Convention into the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA),12 and the Court has suggested that the FAA’s general 
policy favoring arbitration is even more compelling in the 
international context.13 
The New York Convention appears to envision that the courts of 
the country in which the arbitration takes place will furnish the 
primary check on arbitral proceedings.  As Judge Wiener has 
explained, the Convention “mandates very different regimes for the 
review of arbitral awards (1) in the countries in which, or under the 
law of which, the award was made, and (2) in other countries where 
recognition and enforcement are sought.”14  The former courts have 
“primary jurisdiction” over the award, and the Convention “does not 
restrict the grounds on which primary-jurisdiction courts may annul 
an award.”15  Those courts thus “have much broader discretion to set 
aside an award” than courts in other nations, which exercise a 
“secondary” jurisdiction over actions to enforce the award.16  
Secondary jurisdiction courts may refuse recognition only on one of 
several specific bases set forth in the Convention.17 
 
 12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2006). 
 13. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (citations omitted): 
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall 
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable 
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to 
any international business transaction.  Furthermore, such a provision obviates 
the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum 
hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area 
involved. 
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international 
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical 
litigation advantages. 
 14. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 
F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 
F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 15. Id. at 368. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Secondary jurisdiction courts do not, however, appear to be bound by the outcome of 
challenges to an award in the country of primary jurisdiction.  Such courts may, for instance, 
enforce awards held unenforceable in the primary country, and they may also decline 
recognition, notwithstanding the primary jurisdiction court’s refusal to vacate an award, if the 
Convention’s criteria are met.  See id. at 367-68.  “By allowing concurrent enforcement and 
annulment actions, as well as simultaneous enforcement actions in third countries, the 
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When the prevailing party in a foreign arbitration seeks 
enforcement of the award in a domestic court, Chapter V of the 
Convention provides several primarily procedural and quite narrow 
grounds upon which a domestic court may refuse to recognize the 
award.18  Optional reservations to the Convention, both of which were 
incorporated in the U.S. Senate’s ratification of the agreement,19 
restrict the Convention’s coverage to awards made in other signatory 
countries and that arise out of commercial relationships.  The most 
open-ended grounds for nonrecognition, however, are found in 
Section Two of Article V, which permits nonenforcement by a 
domestic court if “[t]he subject matter” of the dispute “is not capable 
 
Convention necessarily envisions multiple proceedings that address the same substantive 
challenges to an arbitral award.” Id. at 367. 
 18. Specifically, the domestic court may deny recognition if: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid 
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(c)  The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within 
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not 
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d)  The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was 
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; 
or 
(e)  The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the 
law of which, that award was made. 
New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(1). 
 19. Id. art. I(3): 
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension 
under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it 
will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made 
only on the territory of another Contracting State.  It may also declare that it 
will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, 
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the 
national law of the State making such Declaration. 
The reservation restricting coverage to international awards arising out of commercial 
relationships is implemented in the FAA at 9 U.S.C. § 202 (providing that “[a]n agreement or 
award arising out of [a commercial] relationship which is entirely between the citizens of the 
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention” unless it has some “reasonable 
relation with one or more foreign states”). 
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of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country,” or if 
“[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country.”20  American courts have generally 
construed these exceptions narrowly in order to promote the general 
policy favoring arbitration of disputes.21  The public policy exception, 
in particular, has eroded significantly over the years.22 
A good example of the narrowness of this exception in practice is 
the Second Circuit’s leading decision in Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale De L’Industrie du Papier 
(RAKTA).23  Overseas, an American company, contracted with 
RAKTA, an Egyptian corporation, to build a paperboard mill in 
Alexandria, Egypt.  In 1967, five years into the contract, the Egyptian 
government severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 
connection with the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and expelled all 
Americans from Egypt except those who could obtain a special visa.24 
When Overseas abandoned the contract, litigation ensued concerning 
whether termination was permitted by a force majeur clause in the 
agreement.  RAKTA ultimately prevailed before an arbitral tribunal 
and sought to enforce the award in the American courts.  Overseas 
opposed enforcement of the arbitral award, primarily on the ground 
that its abandonment of the contract was consistent with United 
States public policy, as indicated by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s withdrawal of financial support for the construction 
project.  The Second Circuit, however, emphasized that “[t]he general 
pro-enforcement bias informing the [New York] Convention . . . 
points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense.”25  The 
Court of Appeals thus concluded that “[e]nforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where enforcement 
would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice.”26 
Unsurprisingly, given this legal framework, one finds many, 
many  cases enforcing foreign arbitral rewards without any significant 
 
 20. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(2). 
 21. See Alford, supra note 2, at 701-04. 
 22. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 63-76 (chronicling the erosion of the public policy 
defense in arbitration cases). 
 23. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 24. Id. at 972. 
 25. Id. at 973. 
 26. Id. at 974. 
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inquiry into the underlying merits of the dispute.27 The regime is thus 
one of extraordinary deference, largely comparable to the “full faith 
and credit” that American domestic courts owe to judgments 
rendered by the courts of their sister states.28  As the next section 
demonstrates, however, American domestic courts are not always so 
receptive to foreign law in general and to the decisions of 
supranational courts in particular. 
B. Reception of Foreign Law and Supranational Court Decisions 
Notwithstanding the deferential treatment accorded to foreign 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention, American 
jurisprudence has recently been marked by heated debates about the 
propriety of citing foreign decisions and legal practices, and by 
considerable skepticism toward the decisions of supranational 
tribunals.  American courts have long taken account of foreign 
practice and decisions,29 but the Supreme Court has sparked 
controversy by prominently citing foreign sources in a string of cases 
overruling prior precedent and extending the scope of constitutional 
rights to sexual privacy and against cruel and unusual punishment.30  
The debate has spilled over into the world outside the courts, as 
 
 27. E.g., Land, Air & Sea Transp. v. El Nasr Mining Co., No. 06-13482, 2008 WL 612732, at 
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008); Suraleb, Inc. v. Prod. Ass’n “Minsk Tractor Works,” No. 06-3496, 
2008 WL 294839, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2008); China Three Gorges Project Corp. v. Rotec 
Indus., No. 04-1510, 2005 WL 1813025, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2005); Rintin Corp. v. Domar, 
Ltd., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169-71 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Shanghai Foodstuffs Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. 
Int’l Chemical, Inc., No. 99-3320, 2004 WL 213019, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004); Compagnie 
D’Enterprises CFE, S.A. v. Republic of Yemen, 180 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2001); Empresa 
Construtora Context Limitada v. Iseki, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1023-26 (S.D. Cal. 2000); 
Trans Chemical Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 308-10 (S.D. 
Tex. 1997). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 29. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2006); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign 
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
 30. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), and concluding that prohibitions on homosexual sodomy violated the constitutional 
right to privacy grounded in the Due Process Clause); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 402 U.S. 302 (1989), and concluding that executing mentally 
retarded individuals offends “evolving standards of decency” embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment).  For a sampling of the academic debate, see Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2004) (articles by T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Roger P. Alford, Harold Hongju Koh, Gerald L. Neuman, and Michael D. Ramsey); 
Comment, The Debate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV. 103 (2005) 
(essays by Vicki Jackson, Jeremy Waldron, and Ernest A. Young). 
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Members of Congress have even gone so far as to introduce 
legislation forbidding the citation of foreign materials in 
constitutional adjudication.31 
The leading case here is Roper v. Simmons,32 in which the 
Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma33 and struck down the application of state death penalty 
laws to capital murderers who committed their crimes before reaching 
the age of eighteen. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper 
relied significantly upon the fact that few foreign jurisdictions permit 
the imposition of the death penalty in similar circumstances.34  That 
reliance drew a stinging rebuke from Justice Scalia, who insisted in 
dissent that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that 
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—
ought to be rejected out of hand.”35  Although Justice Scalia’s position 
 
 31. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United 
States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless 
such judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of 
the laws of the United States.”).  The resolution did not pass, but it did attract sixty co-sponsors.  
See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of 
Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (2007) (describing efforts 
by members of Congress to limit the judiciary’s use of foreign law). 
 32. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 33. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 34. See id. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States 
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”).  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[t]his reality does not become controlling, for 
the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court’s] responsibility.”  Id.  But 
he noted that “the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international 
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel 
and unusual punishments.’” Id. (citations omitted).  Foreign law comparison was, in fact, quite 
important to the Court’s reasoning.  See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the 
Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Foreign Law]. 
 35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting references to foreign law in invalidating state 
sodomy laws).  Tellingly, Justice Scalia noted that the justices in the majority were unwilling to 
embrace foreign views on libel law, abortion, or separation of church and state—all areas in 
which the U.S. Constitution imposes unusually broad restrictions on government.  Roper, 543 
U.S. at 624-27. “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it 
otherwise,” he observed, “is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.” Id. at 627.  Justice 
Scalia expounded his views in more depth in a public debate with Justice Breyer on the subject 
at American University.  Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American 
University Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions 
(Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/-
1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocu
ment). 
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was in the minority in Roper and other recent cases, there is reason to 
believe that the two justices appointed since those cases were 
decided—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito—may 
well share his skepticism.36  
A similar skepticism was on full display in Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon,37 which concerned the degree of deference that domestic 
courts should pay to the interpretation of an international treaty by 
the International Court of Justice.  Sanchez-Llamas involved two 
consolidated appeals under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR).38  Article 36 of the VCCR requires signatory 
nations to inform foreign nationals arrested for crimes that they have 
a right to contact their consulate.39  Mario Bustillo, the non-
eponymous petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas,40 was a Honduran national 
arrested, tried, and convicted of murdering a man in Virginia.  
Although Virginia authorities failed to notify Mr. Bustillo of his rights 
under the VCCR, Bustillo failed to raise this issue until he sought 
collateral review in state court.  The state courts accordingly held 
Bustillo’s claim “procedurally barred” by his failure to raise the issue 
at trial or on direct review.41  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, 
 
 36. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (expressing “concern . . . about the use of foreign law as 
precedent”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be Associate 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 370-71 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congr-ess/senate/pdf/109hrg/25429.pdf (“[T]here are situations in 
litigation that come up in Federal court when it is legitimate to look to foreign law, but I don’t 
think it’s helpful in interpreting our Constitution.”).  Perhaps significantly, Justice Kennedy did 
not cite foreign law in the Court’s latest Eighth Amendment decision, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 37. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). 
 38. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
 39. Id. art. 36(1)(b). 
 40. The Court consolidated Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51, together with Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, No. 04-10566, presumably because both petitions raised issues under the VCCR.  
The petition of Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national convicted of attempted murder in 
Oregon, raised the question whether exclusion of statements made prior to notification of the 
foreign national’s right to contact his consulate is an appropriate remedy for a VCCR violation.  
The Supreme Court held that it is not.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2678-82.  Because the ICJ has never 
interpreted the VCCR to require exclusion of evidence, Mr. Sanchez-Llamas’s petition did not 
raise the issue of deference to supranational rulings.  The Court did look to foreign practice in 
resolving the exclusionary rule question. 
 41. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677.  The Virginia state courts’ decisions in the case 
are unreported.  The doctrine of procedural default applied by the Virginia courts mirrors the 
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rejecting Bustillo’s argument that the doctrine of procedural default 
does not apply to VCCR claims.42 
Mr. Bustillo’s primary argument to the Court relied on the 2004 
decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Avena case, 
brought by Mexico against the United States to vindicate the VCCR 
rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in various 
American jurisdictions.43  Unlike most signatories to the VCCR, the 
United States was—at the time of the Avena litigation—a signatory to 
an “Optional Protocol” conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ to resolve 
state-to-state disputes under the VCCR.44  In Avena, the ICJ 
considered and rejected the notion that VCCR claims could be barred 
by the doctrine of procedural default; that doctrine, the ICJ 
announced, impermissibly prevented the domestic courts from giving 
“full effect” to rights conferred by the VCCR.45  Bustillo—along with 
a number of amicus briefs representing international law scholars, 
diplomats, and foreign sovereigns46—thus asked the U.S. Supremes to 
defer to the ICJ’s reading of the treaty and, effectively, hold 
Virginia’s procedural default rule preempted by the treaty’s force as 
supreme federal law. 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, refused to do so.47  The Chief Justice allowed that “[t]he 
 
doctrine applied in federal habeas corpus proceedings.  See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 
U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977). 
 42. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687. 
 43. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31). 
 44. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.  Only 44 of the 170 parties to the VCCR are also 
parties to the Optional Protocol.  The U.S. exercised its right to withdraw from the Optional 
Protocol following the Avena decision.  Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State to 
Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2005/101_200/186E.doc. 
 45. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72; see also LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-
98 (June 27) (reaching the same conclusion). 
 46. E.g., Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners Mario A. Bustillo and Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 6, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3543101, at *3-4; Brief of International Court of 
Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 
548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3597807, at *20-24; Brief for Amici Curiae 
Republic of Honduras and Other Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3597807, at *9-15. 
 47. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito.  Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, but she agreed with the Chief in refusing to 
defer to the ICJ’s reading of the treaty.  See  Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. 
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ICJ’s interpretation deserves ‘respectful consideration,’” but he 
insisted that the Supreme Court’s power “‘to say what the law is’” 
extends to treaties.48  The majority’s analysis, moreover, made 
relatively short work of the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty, noting 
that the VCCR itself mandates that the rights it conferred be 
implemented according to the procedural rules of each domestic legal 
system.49  Chief Justice Roberts also suggested that the judges of the 
ICJ—most of whom were trained in civil law systems with 
inquisitorial models of criminal prosecution—misunderstood the 
critical role of procedural default rules in an adversary system of 
justice.50 
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent would have read the VCCR 
in a manner “consistent with the ICJ’s reading of the Convention.”51  
Justice Breyer assumed—apparently without deciding—“that the 
ICJ’s interpretation does not bind this Court,”52 and much of his 
opinion was devoted to developing a strained reading of the ICJ’s 
opinion that the Court would not have to reject as inconsistent with 
domestic law.53  Nonetheless, the dissent’s view of “respectful 
consideration” was plainly far more deferential to the ICJ than that of 
the majority.54 
Sanchez-Llamas is unlikely to end debate on the Court on the 
more general question of interpretive deference to supranational 
rulings—a question I have canvassed in more depth in a companion 
 
 48. Id. at 2683-84 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998), and Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 49. Id. at 2682-83. 
 50. Id. at 2685.  Procedural default rules also play a crucial role in mediating potential 
conflicts between parallel systems of courts.  See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at 
1180-88.  International lawyers have generally discounted such concerns, invoking the principle 
that a party to a treaty “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  However, this principle will have to be interpreted more narrowly if the 
international and domestic legal systems are to be successfully integrated.  Young, Institutional 
Settlement, supra note 1, at 1180-82.  The current international law approach—which insists on 
ignoring how domestic legal systems actually operate—is hardly promising. 
 51. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 2700 (emphasis added). 
 53. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 107. 
 54. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 
65, 101-08 (2007) (reading the dissent as embracing a more deferential “comity model” of 
interpretive authority). 
YOUNG_FMT3.DOC 10/15/2008  2:25:32 PM 
2008] SUPRANATIONAL RULINGS 489 
essay to this one.55  The important point for present purposes is that 
its holding strongly encourages domestic courts to exercise 
independent judgment in interpreting treaties, even when foreign or 
supranational courts have already spoken.56  Neither the Sanchez-
Llamas majority nor the dissent was prepared to give the ICJ’s 
opinion in Avena the kind of deference that domestic courts accord to 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention—that is, minimal 
procedural scrutiny combined with an almost categorical refusal to 
second-guess the foreign ruling on the merits. 
The Court took a further, non-deferential step in its most recent 
decision, Medellín v. Texas.57  José Ernesto Medellín confessed to 
brutally raping and murdering two teen-age girls as part of a gang 
initiation in Houston, Texas.  The Texas state courts tried and 
convicted him of capital murder and sentenced him to death.58  As a 
Mexican national, however, Medellín was entitled to consular 
notification under the VCCR, and the Mexican government has 
 
 55. See Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law” (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author) [hereinafter Young, Part of Our Law]. 
 56. In her remarks at this Symposium, Melissa Waters suggested that the “respectful 
consideration” stance adopted by the majority reflects a term of art, and that the standard 
adopted in Sanchez-Llamas is actually more deferential than most commentators have 
interpreted it to be.  See Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication System - part 3 
(Feb. 15, 2008) (webcast, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/).  Professor Waters 
rightly notes that the “respectful consideration” language also appears in a line of cases 
involving U.S. Supreme Court review of state court decisions on state law matters.  See id. Such 
review is ordinarily blocked by the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, which 
holds that “where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal 
and the other nonfederal in character, [the Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal 
ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.”  Fox Film 
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).  But sometimes the Court is willing to address the 
state law ground in order to ensure that the state courts are not manipulating state law in order 
to defeat the assertion of federal rights.  See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 
(1938) (reviewing a state court’s determination that no contract existed because that 
determination was antecedent to a federal claim of impairment under the Contract Clause).  
When the Court engages in this sort of review—which is rare—it “accord[s] respectful 
consideration and great weight to the views of the state’s highest court.” Id. at 100.  As I explain 
at greater length elsewhere, see Young, Part of Our Law, supra note 55, I doubt that “respectful 
consideration”—even if that term is the same as “respectful consideration and great weight”—
has a settled meaning in this context, as the review-of-state-courts cases themselves are highly 
sporadic and inconsistent.  Normatively speaking, it would be inappropriate to accord the same 
level of deference that the federal courts give to state judicial interpretations of the state’s own 
law in a case like Sanchez-Llamas, in which a federal court interpreted a treaty of the United 
States which is part of federal law under the Supremacy Clause.  Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 
2681-84. 
 57. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 58. See Medellín v. State, Order, No. AP-71,997, slip op. (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997). 
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argued that, with its aid and advice, Medellín might have pled guilty 
to a non-capital charge or at least achieved a more favorable result at 
the sentencing phase of his trial.59  Texas conceded that it failed to 
meet its VCCR obligations in this case, but it argued—and both the 
state courts and the lower federal courts agreed60—that Medellín’s 
VCCR claim was barred by procedural default on account of his 
failure to raise it in the state trial courts or on direct appeal. 
Mr. Medellín thus found himself in a similar position to Mr. 
Bustillo in Sanchez-Llamas.  Unlike Bustillo, however, Medellín is 
one of the fifty-one Mexican nationals covered by the ICJ’s judgment 
in the Avena case.  Whereas Bustillo had to ask the U.S. Supreme 
Court to defer to the precedential force of the ICJ’s interpretation of 
the VCCR to preempt domestic procedural default rules, Medellín 
sought to invoke the force of the ICJ’s ruling as a binding judgment.  
That effort was unavailing, however.  The Supreme Court held, 6-3,61 
that the Avena judgment was not “self-executing”—that is, that it did 
not “create[] binding federal law in the absence of implementing 
legislation” enacted by Congress.62  Chief Justice Roberts’ majority 
 
 59. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support 
of Petitioner José Ernesto Medellín at 2-3, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-
984) (arguing that “Mexico has provided critical resources to aid in the defense of its nationals 
facing the death penalty”).  It is worth noting, however, that unlike many VCCR claimants, 
Medellín was hardly a stranger in a strange land.  He had lived in the United States since the age 
of three, attended American schools, was fluent in English, and was no stranger to the 
American criminal justice system.  See Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2004).  
The Texas trial court, moreover, found—as an alternative holding to its procedural default 
ruling—that Medellín had not been prejudiced by the State’s failure to observe his VCCR 
rights.  See Brief for Respondent at 49-50, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) 
(noting that the trial court found that the failure to notify the Mexican consulate did not 
prejudice the defendant and that “[t]he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed”).  On the 
potentially critical importance of this holding, see infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Ex parte Medellin, No. WR-50,191-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2001) (not 
designated for publication); Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito.  Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1352.  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the 
relevant treaties did not render the Avena judgment self-executing.  See id. at 1372 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Breyer dissented on behalf of himself and Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg.  Id. at 1375. 
 62. Id. at 1357.  The Court also rejected an effort by President George W. Bush to 
“execute” the Avena judgment by issuing an order to the state courts, holding that “the 
Executive cannot unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.”  
Id. at 1371; see also infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text. 
  In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I was a primary author of amicus briefs in 
support of Texas in both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Those briefs, which addressed only the President’s memorandum, argued that the President’s 
action was an unconstitutional intrusion not only on Congress’s authority but also on judicial 
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opinion reached this conclusion based on the language of the 
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter, which respectively confer 
jurisdiction on the ICJ and impose on U.N. members states an 
obligation to comply with the ICJ’s rulings.63  The Court relied as well 
on the existence of an alternative enforcement mechanism for ICJ 
rulings at the Security Council and the fact that “neither Medellín nor 
his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as 
binding in domestic courts.”64  In dissent, Justice Breyer complained 
that “insofar as today’s holdings make it more difficult to enforce the 
judgments of international tribunals . . . those holdings weaken that 
rule of law for which our Constitution stands.”65 
Taken together, Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín seem to embody a 
strong skepticism of supranational rulings as both precedents and 
judgments.  This skepticism is, as I have noted, a far cry from the 
warm reception that foreign arbitral rulings receive in U.S. courts 
under the New York Convention.  I explore some possible 
explanations for this striking difference in treatment in the next Part. 
II. EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY 
One could be forgiven for finding the attitudes struck by 
American courts toward foreign and international rulings somewhat 
schizophrenic.  Our courts warmly embrace foreign arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention and narrowly construe the 
Convention’s permissible grounds for challenging such awards.  Yet 
any effort by American jurists to cite foreign authority in 
constitutional interpretation is contentious, and interpretations of 
U.S. treaties by supranational courts in cases like Sanchez-Llamas 
and Medellín are greeted with considerable skepticism.  What is going 
on? 
 
independence and state autonomy.  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional and 
International Law Scholars in Support of Respondent State of Texas, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. 
Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), available at http://www.debev-oise.com/publications/pdf/-
TexasconstitutionalandintllawscholarsamicusMedellin2007.PDF [hereinafter Medellín Scholars’ 
Brief]; Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75-
207), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA%20State%20Am-icus.PDF. 
 63. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357-59; see also infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text 
(discussing the provisions of the Optional Protocol and the Charter). 
 64. See 128 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (discussing the Security Council procedure); id. at 1363-64 
(discussing the practice of other nations). 
 65. Id. at 1391 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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One possibility is to think of this disparity as one between 
“public law” and “private law” cases.  That would not in itself be an 
explanation, but it might suggest some plausible hypotheses regarding 
the relative isolation of the two fields or the different functions that 
courts perform in each area.  I want to suggest, however, that greater 
deference to arbitration decisions has less to do with the 
public/private law dichotomy than it does with two other factors: the 
difference between enforcing a judgment settling a particular dispute 
and establishing a general rule of law to guide future disputes, and the 
presence or absence of legislative action specifying the status of 
supranational rulings.  U.S. courts’ emphasis on these factors strikes 
me as entirely correct.  A dramatically lesser degree of deference for 
foreign precedents than for foreign judgments is entirely appropriate 
in both “public” and “private” law settings.  And congressional 
primacy concerning the status of foreign judgments is appropriate, in 
most circumstances, even if one believes that the underlying treaties 
should generally be considered self-executing.  Before developing 
these points, however, I want to start with some reasons to question 
the comparison between arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention and cases like Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín. 
A. Apples or Oranges? 
For the disparity in treatment between foreign arbitral awards 
and foreign public law decisions to be meaningful, the two sets of 
cases need to be at least somewhat analogous.  In this section, I 
suggest that the comparison is more tenuous than might appear at 
first glance.  The distance between arbitral enforcement cases and the 
use of foreign decisions in cases like Roper v. Simmons, for instance, 
should be obvious: Roper did not involve “enforcement” of any 
foreign decisions, and the legal provisions interpreted in those 
decisions—national constitutions and statutes, international custom 
and treaties—were different from the provision at issue in the U.S. 
case. And while Sanchez-Llamas did involve the force of a 
supranational court decision interpreting the same treaty on the same 
issue before the domestic court, it involved the precedential force of 
the foreign opinion rather than the respect due to the foreign 
judgment—a crucial distinction that I take up in the next section.  In 
this section, I want to focus on some additional distinctions between 
foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the 
judgments of supranational tribunals. While some of these 
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distinctions may seem technical, I suggest that they stem from 
important functional differences between the two situations. 
Most of the cases enforcing arbitral awards involve foreign rather 
than supranational arbitrators.  As Roger Alford has demonstrated, 
there are all sorts of difficulties bringing supranational tribunals 
within the requirements of the New York Convention.  “The text and 
preparatory materials,” he notes, “suggest that international tribunals 
established solely to resolve interstate disputes are not intended to be 
subject to traditional enforcement mechanisms under the New York 
Convention.”66  Where the agreements establishing supranational 
arbitral bodies are entered into by states, moreover, it is unclear 
whether awards secured by or against private parties are covered by 
“an agreement in writing” to arbitrate within the meaning of the 
Convention; in such cases, the Convention will apply only if the 
nation’s agreement is imputed to its private nationals.67  Moreover, 
“[m]ost international tribunals render ‘anational’ awards governed by 
the international legal system and not subject to the control of a 
single national state.  They therefore should not be viewed as arbitral 
awards subject to New York Convention enforcement.”68 
These are not just technical impediments.  Consider, for 
example, the potential extension of the Convention to cover 
supranational decisions, where the arbitral award involves individuals 
who were not themselves parties to the agreement creating the forum.  
Where the private parties are plaintiffs, such extension of arbitration 
 
 66. See Alford, supra note 2, at 708. 
 67. See id. at 705-07.  See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II(1)-(2) (“Each 
Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to 
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them 
in respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not . . . . The term ‘agreement 
in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by 
the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”).  In Ministry of Defense of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the New York Convention required 
enforcement of an award by the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal against a private party, even though 
that party was not a party to the agreement creating the tribunal.  According to Judge 
O’Scannlain, “the real question is not whether Gould entered into a written agreement to 
submit its claims against Iran to arbitration, but whether the President—acting on behalf of 
Gould—entered into such an agreement. The answer is clearly yes.”  Id. 
 68. Alford, supra note 2, at 709 (citation omitted).  See New York Convention, supra note 
9, art. I(1)-(2) (“This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought . . . . The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only 
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral 
bodies to which the parties have submitted.”). 
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agreements entered into by state parties to cover claims by one of the 
states’ nationals would effectively create a private right of action for 
individual plaintiffs.  Such private rights of action are relatively rare 
in international law, and they are controversial where they do exist.69  
Where arbitral awards are enforced against private parties who did 
not individually consent to the supranational forum,70 on the other 
hand, a crucial line between arbitration and adjudication is crossed.  
As the U.S. delegation that participated in drafting the Convention 
reported,  
[i]t is definitely understood . . . that the convention applies only 
to awards resulting from arbitrations to which the parties have 
submitted voluntarily.  If the arbitration were conducted by a 
permanent body to which the parties are obligated to refer their 
disputes regardless of their will, the proceedings are judicial 
rather than arbitral in character and the resulting award 
consequently could not come within the purview of the 
convention.71 
Further, there may well be significant functional differences 
between arbitral awards rendered by panels under the auspices of a 
particular state and those rendered by supranational bodies.  On the 
judicial side, after all, courts and commentators have frequently been 
more willing to defer to foreign courts than to supranational ones.72 
The reason is that foreign tribunals are generally enmeshed in a 
system of checks and balances created by domestic law, and the 
foreign state’s political branches will have an interest in ensuring that 
neither courts nor arbitral bodies treat foreign parties arbitrarily.73  
 
 69. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20; see also Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 2154 (“[I]ndividual access 
can be expected to enhance international court influence, both by creating a domestic 
constituency for the Court’s rulings and eliminating discretionary barriers to the review of 
sensitive cases.”). 
 70. This was the case in Gould, as described by Professor Alford.  See Alford, supra note 2, 
at 705-07. 
 71. United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, May 20-June 10, 
1958, Official Report of the United States Delegation 6 (Aug. 15, 1958) (quoted in Leonard V. 
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1061 n.54 (1961). 
 72. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 2, at 716-21 (noting that federal courts afford comity to 
judgments by foreign courts but observing that “there are no reported instances in the past 
century in which decisions of an international tribunal have been subject to enforcement and 
recognition” similar to judgments by foreign courts). 
 73. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law 
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 2012 (2004) (arguing that U.S. courts should 
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The extent to which these checks actually operate will, of course, vary 
significantly depending on the particular foreign state involved.  But 
tribunals existing wholly outside any such structure seem likely to be 
less accountable still. 
Where an award is subject to Convention enforcement because it 
is controlled by a particular state’s domestic law, the analogy to cases 
like Sanchez-Llamas fails on a different ground—that is, that the 
domestic court enforcing the award is not deferring to the 
supranational panel’s interpretation of international law.  If, for 
example, an American court were asked to defer to a NAFTA 
arbitration panel’s interpretation of Canadian law, there is no a priori 
reason to think that the supranational arbitrators have any 
compelling advantage in expertise. And while a supranational body 
might be better positioned to encourage uniform interpretations of 
international law, that is hardly the case with respect to domestic law.  
The only interpreters with a clear claim to deference concerning the 
law of a foreign state are the courts of that state.74 
These differences between enforcement and recognition in the 
arbitration context and the question in cases like Sanchez-Llamas and 
Medellín might be sufficient to explain the different results that occur 
in each context.  But I also think the organizers of this conference are 
right to suspect that something more fundamental is going on. After 
all, the presence of a statute mandating recognition of arbitration 
awards simply begs the question: Why has Congress not mandated 
similar deference to ICJ decisions? The reason, I think, has less to do 
with the public/private distinction than with the different functions 
that arbitral tribunals and courts perform in resolving disputes. 
B. Public and Private Law 
It is somewhat tempting to explain the disparity between 
enforcement of arbitral awards and non-deference to courts like the 
ICJ in terms of the longstanding distinction between “private” and 
“public” law.  Harold Maier has observed that, “[h]istorically, public 
international law and private international law have been treated as 
 
enforce the delegation doctrine more strictly “in the foreign context where political checks on 
international agency action are weak”); Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial 
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 196 (“The [American] judiciary remains accountable to the 
other branches of government and cannot stray too far from their preferences.”). 
 74. Cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (holding that federal circuit 
courts should not defer to federal district courts construing the law of the state in which they 
sit). 
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two different legal systems that function more or less 
independently.”75  The New York Convention itself furthers this 
temptation to ground the disparity in domestic treatment of foreign 
rulings in the public/private dichotomy; after all, the Convention (as 
adopted by the United States) restricts its coverage to disputes arising 
out of “commercial” relationships.  Hence, Roger Alford has 
suggested that “[m]any international tribunals are engaged in 
functions that intuitively one would exclude from the category of 
arbitration. Among these include tribunals responsible for 
prosecuting crimes, determining human rights violations, and 
resolving personnel and administrative disputes.”76 
I want to resist relying on any sort of “public/private” or 
“commercial/noncommercial” distinction, however.  As John 
Gotanda has noted, at least some sorts of international arbitrations 
“may involve public and/or private international law.  At times, the 
divide is clear, but in many cases it is not.”77  For one thing, it is not 
impossible to imagine extending arbitration to the areas Professor 
Alford cites. “Personnel and administrative disputes,” for example, 
are sometimes subject to arbitration in the domestic sphere,78 and 
there is no reason in principle that an arbitrator could not decide a 
human rights claim.  While a public/private or 
commercial/noncommercial distinction surely has intuitive appeal, 
such distinctions are notoriously slippery in practice.  The Legal 
Realists have left American lawyers highly skeptical of public/private 
dichotomies,79 and it is easy to see the public interest ramifications of 
 
 75. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between 
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 280 (1982). 
 76. Alford, supra note 2, at 707. 
 77. John Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, 326 RECUEIL DES COURS 73, 91 
(2007). 
 78. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991) 
(permitting arbitration for an age discrimination claim regardless of the EEOC’s role in 
regulating employment disputes); Olroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that an employee’s claim that he was unlawfully terminated as a whistleblower was 
subject to an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes); Mgt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc. v. Nebel, 
765 F. Supp. 419, 422 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that “nonunion account executives[] do not fall 
within the exception outlined in § 1 of the FAA” and enforcing and compelling arbitration 
between the employees and their employer). 
 79. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 519 (2005) (“[T]he public/private distinction in international law 
is difficult to maintain in light of the extensive critique of all public/private distinctions that has 
been mounted by legal realists . . . .”); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the 
State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 856-57 (2006) (“In 
YOUNG_FMT3.DOC 10/15/2008  2:25:32 PM 
2008] SUPRANATIONAL RULINGS 497 
large-scale arbitrations that affect, say, the business prospects of key 
domestic employers, the availability of insurance proceeds to clean up 
toxic waste dumps,80 or rights to reproduce life-saving drugs.81 
Likewise, American courts have struggled for two centuries to 
define the boundaries of “commercial” activity.82 Current law equates 
“commercial” with “economic” activity83—a broad category indeed—
and a vocal minority would extend the reach of Congress’s power 
over “commerce” further still, including to human rights concerns 
such as violence against women.84  At a minimum, any plausible 
definition of “commercial” seems likely to include large swathes of 
“public” law.  What would one do with a case like Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council,85 for example, which involved trade sanctions 
imposed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Burma? 
Massachusetts disadvantaged companies bidding for state contracts if 
the company in question also did business in Burma.  The point of the 
trade sanctions, of course, was to vindicate the strong view of the 
People of Massachusetts that the military junta in Burma had a 
deplorable human rights record.  On the other hand, the case 
involved the right to bid on contracts—frequently involving 
multinational corporations—and in fact several foreign nations 
 
the United States, few would still defend the autonomy of private law; it is commonplace that 
the public/private distinction is an illusion.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Disston Co. v. Sandvik, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 745, 749 (W.D. Va. 1990) (granting 
motion to compel arbitration of CERCLA claims concerning toxic waste disposal); Leksi, Inc. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 736 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.N.J. 1990) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine any interest 
that New Jersey could have that would be more compelling . . . than its interest in determining 
the availability of funds for the cleanup of hazardous substances located within its 
boundaries.”). 
 81. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 
305-08 (2002) (describing the tension between private patent rights and public health initiatives 
in light of a patent arbitration decision ordering Canada to “repeal statutory provisions that 
allowed generic drug manufacturers to stockpile patent products” and noting the acute 
problems associated with the AIDS crisis in Africa). 
 82. Compare, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (defining “commerce” as 
navigation or “intercourse”), and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (defining 
“commerce” narrowly to exclude manufacturing), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (defining Congress’s power over “commerce” to include labor practices 
concerning manufacturing employees), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding 
that possession of a firearm was not “commercial” activity). 
 83. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (holding that the regulation of the use 
of homegrown marijuana for medicinal purposes falls exclusively under Congress’s Commerce 
Power). 
 84. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 664 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 85. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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sought to challenge Massachusetts’ policy through arbitration under 
the WTO agreement.86 Such a case straddles virtually any conceivable 
definition of public/private or commercial/noncommercial, and while 
Crosby itself may be an unusually vivid illustration, the general 
problem is likely to arise far more frequently. 
This is not to say that the public/private distinction has no 
relevance to the deference disparity in domestic courts’ treatment of 
supranational decisions.  The parties to certain kinds of disputes—
e.g., large contractual disputes between corporations—may well be 
more willing than others to submit their claims to a forum that will 
render a decision as to who gets what but not articulate a general 
principle of law to bind future cases.  If that is the case, it may be 
because principles of private international law are more widely seen 
to be settled than principles in the public sphere, which continues to 
feature fundamental disagreements on the scope of human rights, the 
importance of national sovereignty, and other foundational questions.  
Under those circumstances, one would expect nations to be more 
willing to cede to foreign and supranational actors the authority to 
resolve disputes under the law as settled while reserving authority 
over the declaration of public norms. 
As I have already suggested, one hates to generalize about 
categories as broad and ambiguously-defined as “public” and 
“private” law.  In any event, these last points suggest that correlations 
between deference to foreign and supranational tribunals, on the one 
hand, and the public or private nature of the dispute, on the other, are 
driven by the relative importance in each circumstance of the dispute 
settlement and law-declaring functions of courts.  I consider those 
functions in the next section. 
C. The Dispute Settlement and Law-Declaring Functions of Courts 
Most legal decisions perform a dual function: they settle the 
dispute between the parties, and in so doing they declare the law 
governing that dispute.  As John Marshall so famously put it, “the 
province and duty of the judicial department” is “to say what the law 
is.”87  The two functions are, of course, closely connected.  Chief 
 
 86. Id. at 383; see also Mitsuo Matsushita, Major WTO Dispute Cases Concerning 
Government Procurement, 1 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299, 310 (2006).  
For a more extended discussion of Crosby, see Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001). 
 87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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Justice Marshall explained that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, 
to decide on the rights of individuals”—to resolve, in other words, the 
dispute that the parties have brought before it—but “[t]hose who 
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.”88  Indeed, the most persuasive reading of 
Marbury grounds the power of judicial review—surely the most 
dramatic instance of American courts’ law-declaring function—
squarely in the court’s obligation to decide all issues necessary to 
resolve the particular dispute before it.89 
Although the dispute settlement and law-declaring functions of 
judicial decisions are generally connected, it is possible—at least 
formally—to disaggregate them.  Some judicial systems, both abroad 
and in the American states, permit courts to issue advisory opinions, 
which may declare the law on a particular issue without the close 
connection to a litigated dispute between particular parties that is 
required in the U.S. federal courts by Article III of the Constitution.90  
Arbitration, on the other hand, typically aims to settle the dispute 
between the parties without necessarily stating a rule for future cases; 
in many circumstances, the arbitrator need not even articulate the 
grounds of his decision.  To be sure, an advisory opinion may well 
effectively settle a legal dispute that has not yet been brought to 
 
 88. Id. at 170, 177. 
 89. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“The right to declare a law 
unconstitutional arises because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the other of such 
parties in determining their rights is in conflict with the fundamental law.  The exercise of this, 
the most important and delicate duty of this court, is not given to it as a body with revisory 
power over the action of Congress, but because the rights of the litigants in justiciable 
controversies require the court to choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to 
be enacted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power delegated to legislative 
branch of the Government.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67 (5th 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 90. Compare, e.g., MA. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MA. CONST. amend. LXXXV 
(permitting the governor or the legislature “to require the opinions of the justices of the 
supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions”); and 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 85 (“Like the constitutional courts of many European 
nations, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights all enjoy explicit grants of jurisdiction to decide properly 
presented abstract questions.”), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 598 n.4 
(1992)  (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that 
courts do not render advisory opinions rather than resolve genuine controversies between 
adverse parties.”).  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 78-85 (discussing the 
general prohibition on advisory opinions in the federal courts and comparing state and foreign 
examples). 
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court, and a string of consistent arbitral awards may effectively 
establish a norm that other parties can follow. 
Such disaggregation has costs.  Requiring a litigated dispute 
constrains the power of courts by reducing the courts’ opportunities 
to exercise power and narrowing their ability to control their own 
agendas.91  Tying law-declaration to settlement of particular disputes 
also aims at assuring “the functional requisites of effective 
adjudication”—that is, the adversary presentation and concrete 
factual backdrop that will generally assist the court in framing and 
deciding the issues before it.92  Advisory opinions expand the 
circumstances in which courts may act and, at the same time, deprive 
them of some of the inputs necessary for an effective decision.  
Dispute settlement without law-declaration, on the other hand, 
removes important elements of judicial discipline, such as the need to 
articulate a principled ground of decision and to consider the 
potential impact of that principle on the decision of future cases.93  
One of the principal criticisms of the Supreme Court’s intervention in 
Bush v. Gore,94 after all, was that the Court insufficiently explained 
the basis of its reasoning, combined with the fear that the Court’s 
rationale was “a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train 
only.”95 
Just as courts exercise both dispute settlement and law-declaring 
functions, their decisions can be authoritative in two corresponding 
ways: as judgments and as precedents.  Within the domestic legal 
system, the judgment force of a court’s prior decision is expressed 
 
 91. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 67-68; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A 
Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 77-78 (2007). 
 92. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on 
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51 (1984). 
 93. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (1995) (“[T]he true test [of a decision] comes when 
the writing judge reasons it out on paper,” and that “[i]t is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, 
or even switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t 
write.’”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
 94. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 95. Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least 
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 695 (2002) (quoting Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)); see also David A. Strauss, Bush 
v. Gore, What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
184, 185 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (“[T]he majority opinion insisted 
that its rationale was to be applied, essentially, only in this case - basically conceding that the 
result, not the legal principle, dictated the outcome.”). 
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through the rules of full faith and credit and res judicata.96  Ordinarily, 
the judgment will fix the rights and obligations of the parties, subject 
to quite narrow grounds for challenging the original court’s 
jurisdiction and/or procedures.97  When the original judgment has 
been rendered by a foreign court, strong norms of international 
comity98 likewise prescribe enforcement with minimal second-
guessing by the domestic court.99  The New York Convention, of 
course, codifies an even stronger version of the comity principle for 
foreign arbitral awards.100 
The precedential force of a ruling, on the other hand, refers to 
the ruling’s authoritative force in a new proceeding not encompassed 
 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . 
judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (requiring federal courts to 
give full faith and credit to state judgments); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§§ 13-15 (1982) (detailing the rules of res judicata). 
 97. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (“A fundamental precept 
of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata, is that a ‘right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies . . . .’” (quoting Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 
(1897))). 
 98. International “comity” is often used to connote an amorphous set of norms requiring 
deference to foreign law or tribunals.  See generally Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International 
Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998) (surveying and criticizing the various uses of “comity”).  
Respect for foreign judgments is the most precise and well-settled form of “international 
comity” and, as such, is relatively uncontroversial.  See id. at 897. 
 99. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895): 
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign 
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by 
a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the 
foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having 
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and 
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are 
according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear 
and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of 
the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in 
the foreign court unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the 
judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by 
the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it 
should not be given full credit and effect. 
Although Hilton was decided over a century ago, its approach has largely been codified in 
present law. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 
58-59 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 481, 482 (1987). 
 100. Despite efforts to conclude an enforcement treaty on the New York Convention model 
for foreign judicial judgments, such efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.  Hence, it would go 
too far to equate the judgment force of foreign court decisions with that accorded to foreign 
arbitral awards. 
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by the prior judgment.  I want to use both “precedent” and 
“authority” broadly for purposes of the present discussion.  As used 
here, precedent includes both the “vertical” force of decisions issued 
by a court with power of appellate review over a second court, and 
the “horizontal” force of decisions issued by the same court (which 
that court can overrule) or by courts outside the line of appellate 
hierarchy.  As my inclusion of the latter kind of precedent will 
suggest, I take “authority” to include not only the power to bind 
another court but also any situation in which the prior decision carries 
some degree of weight beyond the purely persuasive force of its 
reasoning.101  In Sanchez-Llamas, for example, the question was 
whether—apart from whatever reasons could be mustered in support 
of the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR on the merits—it should 
count for anything that that interpretation had been issued by the ICJ 
as opposed to a brief or a law review article.102  This additional weight 
might derive from the perceived expertise of the other tribunal, the 
need to respect an international tribunal as a matter of foreign 
relations, the need for all courts to coalesce around a uniform and 
settled interpretation, or similar reasons. 
Within the domestic legal system, we generally draw a radical 
distinction between the judgment and precedential force of a court’s 
decision in a prior case.  Consider, for example, a state court lawsuit 
involving a question of federal law, in which the losing party does not 
appeal and the trial court’s ruling thus stands undisturbed as a final 
judgment.  As a judgment, the state trial court’s resolution 
definitively binds the parties, and as a matter of res judicata it will 
bind any court in the land in which enforcement might be 
challenged—up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court.  Equally 
obviously, however, the precedential force of the state court’s ruling 
on the federal question before it is extremely limited.  It will have no 
force at all—beyond the persuasive force of the judge’s reasoning—
on any other state’s courts, much less a lower federal court or the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 
 101. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3-27 (1979) (defining legal authority 
as existing any time the existence of a legal rule counts as a reason for doing or not doing 
something, independent of the underlying reasons for the rule); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 35 (1986); see also Young, Foreign Law, supra note 34, at 151-56 (applying this 
definition to the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign decisions and practices). 
 102. I suppose that there are circumstances when a law review article or a brief might carry 
authoritative weight apart from the persuasiveness of its reasoning—the views on procedure of 
the late Charles Alan Wright come to mind.  But that’s not how the courts treat my articles or 
briefs. 
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As I have already suggested, deference to foreign arbitral awards 
stems from their treatment as judgments that definitively settle the 
dispute between the parties.  When an ordinary court settles such a 
dispute, the force of the judgment stems from the legitimacy of the 
judicial system as a whole, which in turn derives from factors such as 
the courts’ constitutional mandate and the perceived quality of their 
deliberations and procedures.  The force of arbitral judgments, on the 
other hand, derives from the consent of the parties.103  Hence, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that strong judicial deference to 
arbitral awards is tied directly to the fact that the parties have agreed 
to have their dispute settled in such fashion: 
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by 
an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the 
arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract 
that they have agreed to accept.  Courts thus do not sit to hear 
claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate 
court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. . . . [A]s long 
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the 
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a 
court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice 
to overturn his decision.104 
Arbitration is thus, in many respects, equivalent to any other out-
of-court settlement by the parties to a dispute.  Such settlements are 
enforceable in court as a matter of contract,105 generally without any 
inquiry into whether the settlement agreement “correctly” resolved 
the dispute as a matter of law. 
While we may be content to let parties settle their disputes any 
way they like, ceding the law-declaring function of a court to some 
other body is considerably more problematic.  Law declaring is a 
 
 103. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 51 (“The central element of arbitration is the intention 
of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement.”); Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. 
Plan, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1962) (stating that arbitration is “essentially a creature of contract, 
a contract in which the parties themselves charter a private tribunal for the resolution of their 
disputes”).  The Court’s decisions suggest that their solicitude for arbitration stems from the 
parties’ consent, not the enhanced efficiency of arbitration.  In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), for example, the Court upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate 
certain state law claims, even though it would have been more efficient to stay arbitration 
pending resolution of parallel federal claims being litigated in federal court. 
 104. United Paperworkers Int’l, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987). 
 105. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (holding that 
a breach of a settlement agreement is “a claim for breach of a contract, part of the consideration 
for which was dismissal of an earlier federal suit”). 
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public, sovereign function; it affects not only the parties to the dispute 
before the court, but also all other parties that might be affected by 
the legal rule that the court declares.  In those circumstances, the 
consent of the parties cannot compensate for the lack of a 
decisionmaker constituted by and proceeding according to the 
ordinary constitutional and statutory rules governing judicial 
institutions.  No one thinks, for instance, that the reasons articulated 
in an ordinary domestic arbitration award should have precedential 
authority in subsequent litigation in the courts involving different 
parties, other than the persuasive force of the arbitrator’s reasoning. 
Party consent can confer authority on a non-judicial decisionmaker to 
settle the dispute between them, but they cannot empower that 
decisionmaker to declare law that will be authoritative in other 
proceedings. 
This intuition is confirmed by a number of doctrines that protect 
the law-declaring function of the government from being undermined 
through various forms of contractual agreements.  For example, the 
ordinary rule in the federal courts is that, when a dispute becomes 
moot on appeal to a higher court, the opinion of the court below must 
be vacated and the case dismissed.106  When such a case becomes moot 
by reason of settlement of the parties, however, the opinion below is 
presumptively not subject to vacatur, the reason being that “[j]udicial 
precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal 
community as a whole.  They are not merely the property of private 
litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public 
interest would be served by vacatur.”107  When the government itself 
enters into contracts, established doctrine holds that agreements to 
surrender sovereign powers must be stated with unmistakable 
clarity,108 and that in any event, certain sovereign powers simply 
cannot be contracted away.109  These latter cases, while not involving 
 
 106. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). 
 107. United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) 
(quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 108. See, e.g., Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 
52 (1986); Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 420, 421 (1837); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 536-38 (1830). 
 109. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 
U.S. 814, 817-18 (1880); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 519-20 (1848) 
(holding that a State’s contracts do not surrender its eminent domain power).  Both the 
unmistakability and reserved powers or sovereign acts doctrines are construed in great detail in 
United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
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the law-declaring power of courts, do confirm that lawmaking is a 
public function that generally cannot be compromised by private 
agreement. 
Another set of doctrines protect the law-declaring function of the 
U.S. Supreme Court with respect to questions of federal law.  (And 
remember, the meaning of the VCCR in Sanchez-Llamas was, under 
the Supremacy Clause, a federal question.110)  The Supreme Court has 
the last word on the meaning of federal law, overriding conflicting 
interpretations of that law by the state supreme courts,111 state 
executive officials,112 the President,113 and—in the case of 
constitutional law not subject to change through ordinary 
legislation—Congress itself.114  When Congress shifts federal judicial 
business to non-Article III fora, such as adjudication before a federal 
administrative agency, it ordinarily must allow for some degree of 
Article III judicial review, particularly of questions of law.115  And 
while Congress plainly has some power to restrict the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court under Article III’s “Exceptions Clause,”116 
prominent scholars have argued that that power does not include the 
authority to eliminate the Court’s “essential functions,” defined as 
“maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law.”117 
 
 110. See generally Young, Part of Our Law, supra note 55 (emphasizing that U.S. treaties 
are part of federal law). 
 111. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 112. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 113. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 114. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 115. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”).  
See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 337-42 (discussing Congress’s power to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
 117. Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201-02 (1960).  The original version of the “essential functions” 
argument appeared in Henry Hart’s seminal dialogue on jurisdiction-stripping.  Henry Hart, 
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953).  Other scholars have argued that the Court’s law-declaring 
authority over federal law is central to the Supreme Court’s textually mandated position of 
supremacy over the “inferior” federal courts.  See generally James Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 
1433 (2000); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994).  My own view is that the “essential functions” of the Court may not 
be susceptible of a sufficiently precise definition to make them the crux of doctrine limiting 
jurisdiction-stripping, see Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
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Law-declaring is, then, very different from dispute settlement.  
The difference is, in fact, grounded in a dichotomy of public and 
private after all—not public and private law, but rather the public and 
private function of courts.118  That dichotomy is, in turn, reflected in 
the distinction between the precedential and judgment effects of 
judicial rulings.  In my view, this is an entirely sufficient justification 
for the disparity between deference to foreign arbitral awards and 
non-deference to the decisional rationales of foreign and 
supranational courts.  When a foreign decision has only judgmental 
force, we are generally content to defer to the parties’ decision to 
resolve their dispute through foreign arbitration.  But domestic courts 
are considerably more leery of ceding their law-declaring function to 
foreign and supranational courts by deferring to the precedential 
force of foreign decisions. 
One potential objection to this view is grounded in the finer 
points of res judicata law, which in some circumstances extends the 
judgment force of a prior ruling to parties not involved in the original 
litigation.  Under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, a 
party to the original decision may sometimes be bound by factual or 
legal determinations in that decision, even when the original 
judgment is invoked by a non-party to the original litigation.119  This 
doctrine blurs, if only to a minor extent, the distinction between the 
dispute settlement and law-declaring functions of judicial decisions, 
because it turns the judgment force of the prior court’s resolution of 
the dispute between the initial parties into a rule binding at least some 
subsequent cases involving other persons.120 Nonmutual collateral 
estoppel suggests, in other words, that even the judgment force of a 
prior decision may have an impact on future cases. 
This objection has two answers within the law of judgments, 
 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1549 (2000), but there is no doubt that law-
declaring is central to our conception of the Court’s constitutional role. 
 118. It is worth noting that, to some extent, arbitration may protect the courts’ law-declaring 
function by taking cases in which dispute settlement is the preeminent interest at stake out of 
the system, leaving more resources to concentrate on declaring the law in the cases that remain.  
See Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274  (1982). 
 119. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) 
(abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties for assertion of collateral estoppels); 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979) (permitting, in some circumstances, 
the “offensive” use of collateral estoppels by a nonparty to a prior lawsuit). 
 120. It is worth noting, however, that this blurring occurs only in a very narrow category of 
cases. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 358 F.3d 31, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(noting that although the Supreme Court has permitted using nonmutual collateral estoppel, it 
has “disallow[ed] preclusion where it would create perverse incentives or unfairness”). 
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however, and although both are somewhat technical, each points to a 
broader structural principle that reinforces my claim here.  First, 
established doctrine prohibits the use of nonmutual collateral 
estoppel against the Government.121  This is significant because the 
core of the “public international law” category—e.g., human rights 
claims, international law-based challenges to domestic legislation—
will tend to involve the Government as a litigant, so that limiting the 
judgment force of decisions in these areas protects the political 
branches’ authority to participate in the ongoing process of 
interpreting international law and determining the extent to which it 
should be integrated into the domestic legal system.  Moreover, the 
rationale for the exception has been grounded explicitly in the need 
to protect the courts’ law-declaring function.  The Supreme Court has 
thus observed that, because “the Government is more likely than any 
private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which 
nonetheless involve the same legal issues,” “[a] rule allowing 
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such cases 
would substantially thwart the development of important questions of 
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal 
issue.”122 
A second answer stems from the rule limiting the res judicata 
effect of a ruling on a question of federal law when a court’s 
resolution of that question cannot be appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  This unusual situation may arise when a state court decides a 
question of federal law, but because the strict rules of justiciability 
under Article III do not apply to state courts, the issue is decided in a 
case that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot hear on appeal.123  In such 
cases, the Court has said that the state court’s decision of the federal 
issue would not be res judicata for purposes of later proceedings in 
federal court.124  This rule suggests, for example, that a foreign or 
supranational tribunal’s interpretation of a U.S. treaty—a question, as 
the Sanchez-Llamas Court pointed out, not only of international but 
 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
 122. Id. at 160. 
 123. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam) (finding that though the 
state court decided the federal constitutional issue because the plaintiffs were allowed, under 
state justiciability rules, to assert the rights of third parties, the U.S. Supreme Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing under federal law); Doremus 
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (similar). 
 124. See Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 130 (1927); see also HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 138-40 (discussing this rule). 
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also of federal law125—would not bind the federal courts whether or 
not there was mutuality of parties.  After all, the foreign decision 
would not have been within the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.  In any event, the broader point of the rule is that the 
rules of res judicata must give way where necessary to preserve the 
Supreme Court’s power “to say what the law is.”  The law-declaring 
authority of the domestic courts over domestic law thus trumps any 
deference ordinarily owed to a prior judgment. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the structure of many—if not 
most—supranational tribunals emphasize the dispute settlement 
function over the law-declaring function.  The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, for example, declares that the ICJ’s 
decisions have “no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case.”126  Likewise, supranational litigation 
under the NAFTA and the WTO agreement is conducted on an 
explicitly arbitral model, with no formal doctrine of precedent.127  
These arrangements at the international level reflect the civil law 
tradition that “judicial decisions are not a source of law.  It would 
violate the rules against judicial lawmaking if decisions of courts were 
to be binding on subsequent courts.”128  The relevant agreements thus 
seem to contemplate that supranational decisions will have force as 
judgments, not as precedents. 
To be sure, it is always hard to know quite what to make of a 
judicial body’s profession to be not bound by precedent.  After all, as 
Evan Caminker has noted, “frequent adherence to precedent is a 
prerequisite to effective adjudication: Courts simply do not have the 
time to fully address each legal issue raised by every case.”129  And in 
fact, many have noted that the formal rejection of precedent in the 
 
 125. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006). 
 126. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062.  
The Sanchez-Llamas majority emphasized this language in refusing to defer to the ICJ’s 
interpretation of the VCCR in Avena.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 127. See, e.g., Allan Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, 
Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 
280 (1997) (“As part of public international law, GATT/WTO law does not incorporate the 
formal common law doctrine of stare decisis which makes judicial precedents binding.”). 
 128. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA 46 (3d ed. 2007). 
 129. Caminker, supra note 117, at 827; see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1144 (1994) (“We want to avoid being like the man who cannot get to 
work in the morning because he must keep returning home to make quite sure he has turned off 
the gas.”). 
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civil law tradition masks a considerably more complicated reality.130  
The same is true of the ICJ and of arbitrations under the NAFTA and 
WTO agreements, as well as international arbitration more 
generally.131  Still, it surely counts for something that these 
supranational bodies exercise a law-declaring function only in the 
teeth of their enabling agreements, and often without the discursive 
traditions or institutional continuity that are important to maintaining 
a coherent doctrine of stare decisis.132 
D. The Primacy of Congressional Choice 
If I am right that the difference between judgments and 
precedents is critical in determining how domestic courts treat foreign 
and supranational rulings, that suggests that the Medellín case, 
decided this past Term, is a very different case from Sanchez-Llamas. 
Sanchez-Llamas, after all, involved the precedential force of the ICJ’s 
Avena decision; Mr. Medellín, on the other hand, is one of the 51 
Mexican nationals explicitly covered by the Avena judgment.  Does 
that mean Medellín should have been entitled to the relief on his 
VCCR claim that was denied to Mr. Bustillo in Sanchez-Llamas? 
 
 130. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 128, at 47 (“[A]lthough there is no 
formal rule of stare decisis, the practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions. . . .  
[T]he fact is that courts do not act very differently toward reported decisions in civil law 
jurisdictions than do courts in the United States.”). 
 131. A prominent ICJ judge has emphasized, for example, that “a court cannot only resolve 
a particular case but can contribute to the growth of the legal system which resolves future 
cases.  That has preeminently been the case in the common law.  It is true in the international 
legal system as well.”  Stephen M. Schwebel, The Docket and Decisionmaking Process of the 
International Court of Justice, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 543, 546-47 (1990).  Similarly, 
NAFTA and WTO awards frequently parse prior case law. See also, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611-12 (2005) (observing that 
although “[t]he ICJ Statute suggests that tribunals should not rely on private arbitral decisions 
as binding authority . . . . [a]s a practical matter . . . private investors, governments, and arbitral 
tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment treaties”); Alex 
M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration 
and the Future Place of Provisional Application in International Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 372 
(2007) (“[I]n practice, arbitral awards tend to be regarded as a form of soft precedent.”); 
Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 
341, 370 (2007) (arguing that, “[u]nlike domestic arbitration, the international arbitration system 
has also created public goods through an informal system of precedent”); Michael Waibel, 
Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 
716 (2007) (observing that “[a]lthough ICSID awards do not possess the force of precedent, 
ICSID arbitral tribunals frequently rely on past awards”). 
 132. ICJ judgments are often quite conclusory in exposition, which can make it quite 
difficult to determine the meaning of a judgment as precedent.  WTO and NAFTA panels, on 
the other hand, sit for a single case only. 
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Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Medellín majority said 
“no,”133 and I want to defend that answer as correct here, 
notwithstanding the weight that I have just put on the distinction 
between precedents and judgments.134  The reason derives from the 
distinction between the force of a treaty on the international plane 
and its implementation within the domestic legal system.  There is no 
question that the ICJ’s judgment in Avena binds the U.S. as a matter 
of international law,135 and Texas’s subsequent execution of Mr. 
Medellín—if and to the extent that it was carried out without 
providing the “review and reconsideration” mandated by the ICJ’s 
order136—placed  the U.S. in violation of the judgment.  The question, 
however, is how the binding force of that judgment is to be 
implemented within the domestic legal system.  On that question, 
Medellín confirmed the primary role of Congress in specifying, 
through legislation, how foreign and supranational judgments are to 
be enforced in domestic courts.137 
Much of the discussion in (and about) Medellín concerns the 
general question when treaty-obligations are “self-executing”—that 
is, when they may be given effect by domestic courts without further 
action by the political branches.  That is an interesting question,138 but 
the actual issue in Medellín was narrower.  As the Court recognized, 
the “self-execution” question breaks down into a number of quite 
distinct issues.139  While the VCCR is plainly “self-executing” in the 
sense that federal, state, and local law enforcement officers are 
 
 133. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008). 
 134. I put to one side the possibility, noted by the Court but not apparently relied upon as 
the basis for the Court’s ruling, that Medellín cannot be considered a “party” to the Avena 
judgment in the relevant sense.  Compare Id. at 1360 (“[T]he ICJ can hear disputes only 
between nations, not individuals. . . .  The dissent does not explain how Medellín, an individual, 
can be a party to the ICJ proceeding.”), with id. at 1387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Mexico 
brought the Avena case in part in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its 
nationals . . . including Medellín . . . .  Such derivative claims are a well-established feature of 
international law . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 135. See id. at 1365. 
 136. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1365-66. 
 138. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Martin S. Flaherty, History 
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the 
Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vazquez, Laughing]. 
 139. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356-57 & nn. 2-3.  See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) (highlighting several 
distinct issues often lumped together under the notion of “self-executing” treaties). 
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obliged to provide consular notification even in the absence of federal 
implementing legislation,140 that conclusion does not speak to the 
distinct issues of individual rights to assert VCCR violations in 
domestic courts,141 the remedies to be provided for such violations,142 
or the implementation of ICJ judgments.  Indeed, even if the 
Supremacy Clause’s inclusion of treaties as the “law of the land” 
created a general presumption in favor of self-execution,143 there is no 
obvious reason to treat judgments—which the Clause does not 
mention—in the same fashion. 
The Medellín Court treated the self-execution question as a 
particularistic one, eschewing broad default rules in favor of close 
analysis of the relevant treaty provisions.  Its holding thus rested on 
an interpretation of the VCCR’s Optional Protocol and the United 
Nations Charter, under which “[e]ach Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to 
which it is a party.”144  The Court accepted the Executive Branch’s 
construction of the Charter’s language as “a commitment on the part 
of U.N. Members to take future action through their political 
branches to comply with an ICJ decision.”145  Alongside the text, the 
Court also pointed to the Charter’s structure.  In particular, Chief 
Justice Roberts emphasized the Charter’s “sole remedy for 
noncompliance” with an ICJ ruling: “referral to the United Nations 
Security Council by an aggrieved state.”146  The presence of this 
“nonjudicial” remedy, the Court reasoned, was “itself evidence that 
ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic 
 
 140. See Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (“There is no 
question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing.”). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2000) (Selya & Boudin, JJ., 
concurring) (concluding that the VCCR does not create rights enforceable by individuals). 
 142. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682 (2006) (rejecting exclusion of 
evidence as a remedy for a VCCR violation); De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a foreign national’s claim for damages for a VCCR violation under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (permitting a § 1983 claim); United 
States v. Bustos de la Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 163-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering counsel’s failure to 
raise a VCCR argument as the predicate for a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim). 
 143. See, e.g., Vazquez, Laughing, supra note 138, at 2172 (so arguing). 
 144. U.N. Charter art. 94(1). 
 145. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 34, Medellín v. 
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (emphasis in original), quoted at 128 S. Ct. at 1358 
(“We agree with this construction of Article 94.”). 
 146. 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing the U.N. Charter). 
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courts.”147  This reasoning resonates with a line of decisions in 
domestic civil rights cases holding that remedies against state and 
federal officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Bivens decision,148 
respectively, are unavailable if Congress has provided an adequate 
alternative remedy.149 
In the case of arbitral awards under the New York Convention, 
Congress has enacted a statute that expressly obligates and empowers 
the domestic courts to enforce such awards.150  Express statutes 
likewise govern the enforcement of awards under the investor-state 
arbitration provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
although the statutory rules are more nuanced.  Such awards are 
generally enforceable in domestic courts pursuant to the New York 
and ICSID Conventions,151 which are in turn implemented by specific 
domestic legislation.152  But the NAFTA implementing legislation 
 
 147. Id.  The Court also emphasized that “[t]he Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to 
its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.”  Id. at 
1361 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 145 at 
27-29).  The Court did not accord interpretive deference to the ICJ’s own views about the 
binding force of that court’s judgments, noting that courts generally do not have authority to 
determine the res judicata effects of their own judgments.  See id. at 1361 n.9. 
 148. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (recognizing a federal common law right of action, implied under the Constitution itself, 
for violations of constitutional rights by federal officers). 
 149. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981) (holding that fisherman could not use § 1983 as a vehicle for asserting claims under 
federal environmental statutes, because those statutes had their own “elaborate enforcement 
provisions”); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (denying Bivens relief for a federal employee 
alleging retaliatory discharge in denial of his First Amendment rights, on the ground that 
Congress had provided for a statutory remedy before the Civil Service Commission); Schweiker 
v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (rejecting plaintiffs’ Due Process challenge, under Bivens, to 
denial of Social Security benefits on the ground that the Social Security Act provided its own 
administrative and judicial remedies). 
 150. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the 
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction 
under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the 
arbitration.  The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or 
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.”). 
 151. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1136(6), Dec. 8, 
1993, 32 I.L.M. 605, 643; Renee Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. 
Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 287 (“An investor can 
seek enforcement of an award under the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or the 
Inter-American Convention.”). 
 152. The statute implementing the ICSID convention provides that “[a]n award of an 
arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID Convention] shall create a right 
arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award 
shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final 
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strictly limits the ability of parties other than the U.S. to invoke 
NAFTA in domestic litigation, and these limitations presumably limit 
the invocation of supranational NAFTA judgments as well.153  The 
important point, of course, is that for all these arbitration awards, the 
effect of foreign and supranational judgments is defined and limited 
by congressional act. 
There is no such statute for ICJ judgments rendered under the 
VCCR and its Optional Protocol.  I have little doubt that Congress 
could have enacted a statute specifying how ICJ judgments should be 
enforced, or that such a statute could, if Congress so chose, preempt 
state rules of procedural default.154  Congress has not done so, 
however, and the critical importance of that omission was 
underscored by the Medellín Court’s rejection of President George 
W. Bush’s effort to fill the gap by executive fiat.  The President had 
 
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.”  22 U.S.C. § 1650a 
(2006). 
 153. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2006) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may be 
declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or 
application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States 
for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”); id. § 3312(c) (“No person other 
than the United States . . . shall have any cause of action or defense under . . . the Agreement or 
by virtue of Congressional approval thereof . . . .”).  The WTO agreement has been 
implemented similarly.  See id. § 3512(a)(1) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is 
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”); id. § 3512(c)(1)(B) 
(prohibiting challenges to government conduct on the ground that the conduct violates WTO 
obligations). 
 154. A potentially difficult question would remain, however, concerning Congress’s 
authority to require the state courts to provide the “review and reconsideration” mandated in 
Avena.  See generally Medellín Scholars’ Brief, supra note 62, at 18-26 (arguing that the 
President’s order mandating state court review violated principles of federalism and judicial 
independence that also apply to Congress).  As Henry Hart observed a half-century ago, “[t]he 
general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial 
procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).  A congressional 
mandate for state-court review and reconsideration in the Avena cases, notwithstanding 
procedural defaults like Mr. Medellín’s failure to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal, 
would require those courts to set aside a neutral, generally-applicable procedural rule limiting 
state court jurisdiction.  The general rule has long been that although state courts are obligated 
to hear federal claims, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947), that obligation does not 
require them to set aside neutral, generally-applicable jurisdictional constraints, see Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (describing Testa’s holding as applying to “state courts of 
‘adequate and appropriate’ jurisdiction”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (holding 
that federal law preempted a state notice-of-claim statute that would have barred a federal § 
1983 claim, but emphasizing that the statute was not “a neutral and uniformly applicable rule of 
procedure”).  This problem could be avoided, however, by a statute that required federal courts 
to review the Avena cases notwithstanding the petitioners’ procedural default in state court. 
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responded to Avena by issuing a memorandum stating that “the 
United States will discharge its international obligations under 
[Avena] by having State courts give effect to the decision in 
accordance with general principles of comity.”155  The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that this order exceeded the President’s 
constitutional authority,156 however, and the Medellín majority 
agreed.157 
The non-self-executing nature of the Avena judgment was critical 
to this holding about executive power; as Chief Justice Roberts 
explained, “the non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains the 
President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally 
making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”158  If there were some 
general principle that judgments issued under a treaty bind domestic 
courts in the absence of congressional action to the contrary, then 
presumably the President would have authority to “execute” such 
judgments.  Instead, however, the Court said that 
the non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not 
only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the 
President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty 
obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly 
prohibits him from doing so.  When the President asserts the 
power to “enforce” a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally 
creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit 
understanding of the ratifying Senate.  His assertion of 
authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-
executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third 
category [from Youngstown], not the first or even the second.159 
 
 155. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the 
Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena, Feb. 28, 2005, attached as Appendix 2 
to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellín v. Dretke, 
544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928).  The President’s memorandum only covered “cases filed by 
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in [Avena].”  Id.  It thus required state courts to give effect 
to Avena’s force as a judgment, not as a precedent. 
         At the same time that he issued this memorandum, the President also announced that the 
U.S. would withdraw from the Optional Protocal consenting to ICJ jurisdiction in VCCR cases.  
See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44. 
 156. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
 157. 128 S. Ct. at 1367-72.  Justice Breyer’s dissent purported not to reach the executive 
power question, but could not resist expressing considerable skepticism of the majority’s 
conclusion.  See id. at 1390-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 1371 (majority opinion). 
 159. Id. at 1369 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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Medellín thus makes clear that Congress—not the President, and not 
the courts—must determine when foreign and supranational 
judgments will be enforced in the domestic courts of the United 
States. 
Finally, in light of the generally negative reaction to Medellín in 
the international law community, it is worth stressing that the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to give automatic binding force to a 
supranational judgment, as a matter of domestic law, was completely 
typical of the treatment of such judgments around the world.  In 
Europe, for example, judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) lack automatic domestic effect, even though they are 
binding on member states of the Council of Europe as a matter of 
international law.160  As in U.S. law, it is up to the legislatures of the 
respective member states to determine the effect that ECHR 
judgments will have in domestic courts.  Indeed, these member states 
are currently in the process of addressing—by statute—precisely the 
issue confronted in Medellín; as Laurence Helfer reports, “[i]n 2000, 
the Committee of Ministers launched an ambitious programme to 
convince national governments to authorize their courts to reopen 
judicial proceedings following an adverse ECtHR judgment.”161  What 
these reform efforts directed at national legislatures make crystal 
clear, of course, is that there is nothing unusual about Medellín’s 
holding that Congress must decide whether ICJ judgments should be 
enforceable in domestic courts.162 
 
CONCLUSION 
One hesitates to dismiss distinctions between “public” and 
“private” international law as entirely meaningless, but I doubt that 
such distinctions offer a helpful guide to the effect of supranational 
judgments in domestic courts.  Not only are the relevant lines difficult 
 
 160. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the ECHR: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 136 (2008); Georg 
Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Domestic Legal Order, 40 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 359, 374 (2005). 
 161. Helfer, supra note 160, at 150; see also id. (“As of 2006, such remedies are now 
available in 80 per cent of member states in criminal cases and about half of the Convention 
countries in civil and administrative cases.”). 
 162. The Medellín majority recognized as much, noting that “neither Medellín nor his amici 
have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.” 128 S. 
Ct. at 1363. 
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to draw, but at the end of the day there is a powerful public interest in 
the peaceful and efficient resolution of private disputes.  I have 
suggested here that the disparity between the domestic courts’ 
receptivity to foreign arbitral awards and their skepticism of 
supranational judicial rulings in cases like Sanchez-Llamas is best 
understood as a function of two variables: whether the supranational 
or foreign ruling is invoked as a precedent or as a judgment, and 
whether Congress has addressed by statute the effect to be given such 
rulings. 
These variables offer not only a descriptive explanation for what 
goes on when domestic courts address supranational and foreign 
rulings, but also a normative justification for the ways in which such 
cases usually come out.  The judgment force of a judicial ruling 
invokes primarily the dispute-resolution function of courts, and in this 
context, it makes sense to maximize efficiency and respect for the 
agreement of the parties to the particular dispute.  The precedential 
force of such rulings, on the other hand, implicates the courts’ law-
declaring function—a function in which sovereignty-based values of 
accountability and coherence with domestic law play a much greater 
role.  These same values support the Supreme Court’s insistence, in 
cases like Medellín, that Congress must have the final say concerning 
the effect that domestic courts give to foreign and supranational 
rulings. 
The remaining question is whether this account can throw any 
normative light on other aspects of our practice regarding foreign and 
supranational rulings.  In this brief Conclusion, I want to suggest two 
areas that may warrant rethinking.  The first concerns the exceedingly 
narrow scope given to the “public policy” exception under the New 
York Convention.  Consider, for example, the RAKTA case discussed 
in Part I,163 which enforced a foreign arbitral award against an 
American company that had abandoned a contract to build a facility 
in Egypt in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.  The American 
company argued that enforcing the award would be contrary to public 
policy because the United States had cut off diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and withdrawn financial support for the construction project.  
The Second Circuit, however, seemed to reject the notion that the 
relevant “public policy” was that of the United States: 
In equating ‘national’ policy with United States ‘public’ policy, 
the appellant quite plainly misses the mark.  To read the public 
 
 163. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
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policy defense as a parochial device protective of national 
political interests would seriously undermine the Convention’s 
utility.  This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of 
international politics under the rubric of ‘public policy.’  
Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was 
contemplated by the Convention’s framers and every indication 
is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, meant 
to subscribe to this supranational emphasis.164 
This language is, quite frankly, startling: The notion that a court, 
based on its reading of some legislative history indicating a strong 
presumption in favor of arbitration,165 could dismiss the foreign policy 
interests of the United States—in a volatile war zone, no less—as 
“parochial” “vagaries of international politics” simply strains 
credulity, and it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court endorsing that 
extreme approach today.  But perhaps the Second Circuit simply 
meant that international arbitration also carries significant public 
policy weight, and a substantial showing is required to overcome that 
presumption.166 
In any event, the important point for present purposes is that 
even enforcement of judgments between two parties may interfere 
with sovereign functions of law declaration—not simply of courts, but 
of the national political branches as well.  Courts should be cautious 
in construing general statutes governing arbitration, which are 
designed to settle the obligations of private parties, in such a way as 
to undermine articulated governmental policies of more general 
applicability.  Much less should courts dismiss such policies as 
“parochial” in favor of some “supranational” commitment to 
arbitration.  As cases like Sanchez-Llamas and Medellin have 
demonstrated, American law jealously guards the prerogatives of 
domestic institutions to make parochial policies in response to the 
democratically-expressed desires of their constituents. 
 
 164. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société De L’Industrie du Papier 
(RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 165. See id. at 973 (drawing the court’s reading from “the history of the Convention as a 
whole” rather than from any particular text). 
 166. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Second Circuit did suggest that, while the bar is high, the 
relevant public policy is that of the forum state and not some diffuse international community.  
See id. at 974.  But see Hans Smit, Comments on Public Policy in International Arbitration, 13 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 65, 65 (2002) (arguing that “i[t] was international public policy that was 
decisive” in RAKTA). 
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My second suggestion concerns the need for Congress to think 
through its approach to supranational judgments in areas with public 
law implications (however fuzzily defined).  A final judgment model 
works best when participants in an international regime view 
settlement of particular disputes as more important than retaining 
control over the content of the law going forward.  For this reason, 
ICJ judgments concerning the VCCR—which have become means to 
a broader end of attacking the U.S. practice of capital punishment167—
are hardly a promising candidate for supranational resolution.  The 
President was thus surely right to withdraw the U.S.’s consent to ICJ 
jurisdiction over such cases. 
On the other hand, what the President’s withdrawal—coupled 
with his clumsy effort to secure state court compliance with Avena—
implicitly acknowledges is that judgments have special significance, 
even when we are not prepared to acknowledge supranational 
authority to definitively declare the law.  Congress must ultimately 
determine how supranational judgments will be enforced 
domestically, but that hardly means that such judgments can be 
ignored without cost, both to America’s reputation and to the rule of 
law in international affairs.  Congress and the President need to 
extract the U.S. from supranational jurisdiction where the U.S. is not 
prepared to respect the resulting judgments, and to provide a 
statutory basis for domestic enforcement (subject to reasonable 
exceptions as described above) where supranational jurisdiction is 
retained.  The impulse to respect Avena yet prevent future 
recurrences fits this twofold imperative. 
It is worth noting, moreover, that Texas’s course of action in 
executing Mr. Medellin following the Supreme Court’s ruling168 need 
not be seen as a departure from this approach.  Multiple Texas courts 
had previously found, as an alternative holding, that Medellin had not 
been prejudiced by the Houston police’s failure to accord him his 
 
 167. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 
1512 (2003) (describing Mexico’s VCCR litigation as “part of a broad international-law assault 
on the U.S. death penalty”). 
 168. See Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston 
Teens, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5924-476.html.  Despite a new petition from 
Medellin’s attorneys, the Supreme Court refused to halt Medellin’s execution to permit time for 
legislative efforts to implement the Avena judgment.  See Medellin v. Texas, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 
5362 (Aug. 5, 2008).  This action was unsurprising, given the highly uncertain ability of Congress 
to act promptly in an election season, as well as the fact that the Texas legislature will not meet 
until 2009. 
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VCCR rights,169 and Texas relied on this finding to argue that the 
ICJ’s mandate had been satisfied.170  Reasonable minds may differ 
over whether the Texas courts applied the correct prejudice standard 
in making this finding, but because Avena did not define that 
standard, Texas’s reliance on the state courts’ finding hardly amounts 
to defiance of the Avena judgment.  Texas’s filing before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, moreover, undertook to provide the necessary 
“review and reconsideration” for all other persons covered by the 
Avena judgment who remained on Texas’s death row.171  Critics who 
simply assert that Medellin’s execution violated Avena, without 
analyzing the state courts’ prior consideration of prejudice, are far too 
hasty. 
In any event, it seems clear that we have progressed past the 
point that questions about the domestic effect of supranational and 
foreign rulings can be resolved by first principles.  This is as true of 
the distinction between judgments and precedents as it is of any other 
dichotomy; sometimes it will make sense to accord precedential 
deference to supranational rulings, and sometimes we will 
appropriately resist the enforcement of supranational judgments.  
Congress will ultimately have to decide in both cases, and it is high 
time that legislators thought more systematically about the 
architecture of supranational adjudication.172  It may be that history is 
on the side of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s vision of a global “community 
of courts.”173  If so, however, Congress must be the institution to build 
it. 
 
 
 169. See supra note 59; see also Medellin, 2008 U.S. LEXIS at *2-3 (noting that “[t]he United 
States has not wavered in its position that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular 
access”). 
 170. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition in Nos. 08-5573, 08A98, Medellin v. Texas (Aug. 
4, 2008), at 13-16, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/texas-
bio-05-5573.pdf. 
 171. Id. at 17-18. 
 172. For an effort to provoke thought along these lines, see Ernest A. Young, Toward a 
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L. J. 93 (2007). 
 173. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 100 (2004). 
